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We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, financial frictions lead
to equilibrium dispersion in the rates of return to investment. During bubbly episodes, unproductive
investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. Because of this, bubbly episodes
channel resources towards productive investment raising the growth rates of capital and output. The
model also illustrates that the existence of bubbly episodes requires some investment to be dynamically
inefficient: otherwise, there would be no demand for bubbles. This dynamic inefficiency, however,

















Modern economies often experience episodes of large movements in asset prices that cannot be
explained by changes in economic conditions or fundamentals. It is commonplace to refer to these
episodes as bubbles popping up and bursting. Typically, these bubbles are unpredictable and
generate substantial macroeconomic eﬀects. Consumption, investment and productivity growth all
tend to surge when a bubble pops up, and then collapse or stagnate when the bubble bursts. Here,
we address the following questions: What is the origin of these bubbly episodes? Why are they
unpredictable? How do bubbles aﬀect consumption, investment and productivity growth? In a
nutshell, the goal of this paper is to develop a stylized view or model of economic growth with
bubbles.
The theory presented here features two idealized asset classes: productive assets or “capital”
and pyramid schemes or “bubbles”. Both assets are used as a store of value or savings vehicle, but
they have diﬀerent characteristics. Capital is costly to produce but it is then useful in production.
Bubbles play no role in production, but initiating them is costless.1 We consider environments
with rational, informed and risk neutral investors that hold only those assets that oﬀer the highest
expected return. The theoretical challenge is to identify situations in which these investors optimally
choose to hold bubbles in their portfolios and then characterize the macroeconomic consequences
of their choice.
Our research builds on the seminal papers of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985) who viewed
bubbles as a remedy to the problem of dynamic ineﬃciency. Their argument is based on the
dual role of capital as a productive asset and a store of value. To satisfy the need for a store of
value, economies sometimes accumulate so much capital that the investment required to sustain it
exceeds the income that it produces. This investment is ineﬃcient and lowers the resources available
for consumption. In this situation, bubbles can be both attractive to investors and feasible from a
macroeconomic perspective. For instance, a pyramid scheme that absorbs all ineﬃcient investments
in each period is feasible and its return exceeds that of the investments it replaces. This explains the
origins and the eﬀects of bubbles. Since bubbles do not have intrinsic value, their size depends on
the market’s expectation of their future size. In a world of rational investors, this opens the door for
1It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd these idealized asset classes in ﬁnancial markets, of course, as existing assets bundle or package
together capital and bubbles. Yet we think that much can be learned by working with these basic assets. To provide
a simple analogy, we have surely learned much by studying theoretical economies with a full set of Arrow-Debreu
securities, even though only a few bundles or packages of these basic securities are traded in the real world.
1self-fulﬁlling expectations to play a role in bubble dynamics and accounts for their unpredictability.
The Samuelson-Tirole model provides an elegant and powerful framework to think about bub-
bles. However, the picture that emerges from this theory is hard to reconcile with historical evi-
dence. In this model, bubbly episodes are consumption booms ﬁnanced by a reduction in ineﬃcient
investments. During these episodes both the capital stock and output contract. In the real world,
bubbly episodes tend to be associated with consumption booms indeed. But they also tend to be
associated with expansions in both the capital stock and output. A successful model of bubbles
must come to grips with these correlations.
This paper shows how to build such a model by extending the theory of rational bubbles to the
case of imperfect ﬁnancial markets. In the Samuelson-Tirole model, frictionless ﬁnancial markets
eliminate rate-of-return diﬀerentials among investments making them either all eﬃcient or all inef-
ﬁcient. Introducing ﬁnancial frictions is crucial because these create rate-of-return diﬀerentials and
allow eﬃcient and ineﬃcient investments to coexist. Our key observation is quite simple: bubbles
not only reduce ineﬃcient investments, but they also increase eﬃcient ones. In our model, bubbly
episodes are booms in consumption and eﬃcient investments ﬁnanced by a reduction in ineﬃcient
investments. If the increase in eﬃcient investments is sizable enough, bubbly episodes expand the
capital stock and output. This turns out to be the case under a wide range of parameter values.
To understand these eﬀects of bubbly episodes, it is useful to analyze the set of transfers that
bubbles implement. Remember that a bubble is nothing but a pyramid scheme by which the buyer
surrenders resources today expecting that future buyers will surrender resources to him/her. The
economy enters each period with an initial distribution of bubble owners. Some of these owners
bought their bubbles in earlier periods, while others just created them. When the market for
bubbles opens, on the demand side we ﬁnd investors who cannot obtain a return to investment
above that of bubbles; while on the supply side we ﬁnd consumers and investors who can obtain
a return to investment above that of bubbles. When the market for bubbles closes, resources
have been transferred from ineﬃcient investors to consumers and eﬃcient investors, leading to an
increase in consumption and eﬃcient investments at the expense of ineﬃcient investments.
A key aspect of the theory is how the distribution of bubble owners is determined. As in the
Samuelson-Tirole model, our economy is populated by overlapping generations that live for two
periods. The young invest and the old consume. The economy enters each period with two types
of bubble owners: the old who acquired bubbles during their youth, and the young who are lucky
enough to create them. Since the old only consume, bubble creation by eﬃcient young investors
2plays a crucial role in our model: it allows them to ﬁnance additional investment by selling bubbles.
Introducing ﬁnancial frictions also solves a nagging problem of the theory of rational bubbles,
which was ﬁrst pointed out by Abel et al. (1989). In the Samuelson-Tirole model, bubbles can only
exist if the investment required to sustain the capital stock exceeds the income that it produces.
Abel et al. (1989) examined a group of developed economies and found that, in all of them,
investment falls short of capital income. This ﬁnding has often been considered evidence that
rational bubbles cannot exist in real economies. Introducing ﬁnancial frictions into the theory
shows that this conclusion is unwarranted. The observation that capital income exceeds investment
only implies that, on average, investments are dynamically eﬃcient. But this does not exclude the
possibility that the economy contains pockets of dynamically ineﬃcient investments that could
support a bubble. Nor does it exclude the possibility that an expansionary bubble, by lowering the
return to investment, creates itself the pockets of dynamically ineﬃcient investments that support
it. In such situations, the test of Abel et al. would wrongly conclude that bubbles are not possible.
Besides building on the seminal contributions of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985), this
paper is closely related to previous work on bubbles and economic growth. Saint-Paul (1992),
Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), and King and Ferguson (1993) extend the Samuelson-Tirole model
to economies with endogenous growth due to externalities in capital accumulation. In their models,
bubbles slow down the growth rate of the economy. Olivier (2000) uses a similar model to show
how, if tied to R&D ﬁrms, bubbles might foster technological progress and growth.
The model developed in this paper stresses the relationship between bubbles and frictions in
ﬁnancial markets. Azariadis and Smith (1993) were, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to show
that contracting frictions could relax the conditions for the existence of rational bubbles. More
recently, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kraay and Ventura (2007), and Farhi and Tirole
(2009) contain models in which the existence and economic eﬀects of rational bubbles are closely
linked to ﬁnancial frictions. Whereas we derive our results in a standard growth model, these
papers study economies with linear production functions or storage technology.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the Samuelson-Tirole model, provides con-
ditions for the existence of equilibrium bubbles and discusses their macroeconomic eﬀects. Section
3 introduces ﬁnancial frictions and contains the main results of the paper. Section 4 extends these
results to an economy with long-run growth. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
32 The Samuelson-Tirole model
Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985) showed that bubbles are possible in economies that are dy-
namically ineﬃcient, i.e. that accumulate too much capital. Bubbles crowd out capital and raise
the return to investment. We re-formulate this theory in terms of bubbly episodes and provide a
quick refresher of its macroeconomic implications.
2.1 Basic setup
Consider a country inhabited by overlapping generations of young and old, all with size one. Time
starts at t = 0 and then goes on forever. All generations maximize the expected consumption when
old: Ut = Etct+1; where Ut and ct+1 are the welfare and the old-age consumption of generation t.
The output the country is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function of labor and capital:
F (lt,kt) = l1−α
t   kα
t with α ∈ (0,1), and lt and kt are the country’s labor force and capital stock,
respectively. All generations have one unit of labor which they supply inelastically when they are
young, i.e. lt = 1. The stock of capital in period t + 1 equals the investment made by generation t
during its youth.2 This means that:
kt+1 = st   kα
t , (1)
where st is the investment rate, i.e. the fraction of output that is devoted to capital formation.
Markets are competitive and factors of production are paid the value of their marginal product:
wt = (1 − α)   kα
t and rt = α   kα−1
t , (2)
where wt and rt are the wage and the rental rate, respectively.
To solve the model, we need to ﬁnd the investment rate. The old do not save and the young
save all their income. What do the young do with their savings? At this point, it is customary
to assume that they use them to build capital. This means that the investment rate equals the
savings of the young. Since the latter equal labor income, which is a constant fraction 1 − α of
output, the investment rate is constant as in the classic Solow (1956) model:
st = 1 − α. (3)
2That is, we assume that (i) producing one unit of capital requires one unit of consumption, and that (ii) capital
fully depreciates in production. We also assume that the ﬁrst generation found some positive amount of capital to
work with, i.e. k0 > 0.
4Therefore, the law of motion of the capital stock is:
kt+1 = (1 − α)   kα
t . (4)
Equation (4) constitutes a very stylized version of a standard workhorse of modern macroeconomics.
A lot of progress has been made by adding more sophisticated formulations of preferences and
technology, various types of shocks, a few market imperfections, and a role for money. We shall
not do any of this here though.
2.2 Equilibria with bubbles
Instead, we follow the path-breaking work of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985), and assume the
young have the additional option of purchasing bubbles or pyramid schemes. These are intrinsically
useless assets, and the only reason to purchase them is to resell them later. Let bt be the stock of
old bubbles in period t, i.e. already existing before period t or created by earlier generations; and
let bN
t be the stock of new bubbles, i.e. added in period t or created by generation t. We assume
that there is free disposal of bubbles. This implies that bt ≥ 0 and bN
t ≥ 0. We also assume that
bubbles are created randomly and without cost. This implies that new bubbles constitute a pure
proﬁt or rent for those that create them.3
Rationality imposes two restrictions on the type of bubbles that can exist. First, bubbles must
grow fast enough or otherwise the young will not be willing to purchase them. Second, the aggregate
bubble cannot grow too fast or otherwise the young will not be able to purchase them. Therefore,







= α   kα−1
t+1 , (5)
bt ≤ (1 − α)   kα
t . (6)
Equation (5) says that, for bubbles to be attractive, they must deliver the same return as capital.4
The return to the bubble consists of its growth over the holding period. The purchase price of the
bubble is bt+bN
t , and the selling price is bt+1. The return to capital equals the rental rate since each
3Note that new bubbles cannot be linked to the ownership of objects that can be traded before the date the
bubbles appear. Otherwise the bubble would have already apppeared in the ﬁrst date in which the object can be
traded. The reason is simple: a rational individual would be willing to pay a positive price for an object if there is
some probability that this object commands a positive price in the future. See Diba and Grossman (1987).
4We can rule out the possibility that bubbles deliver a higher return than capital. Asssume not and let the return
to the bubble to be strictly higher than the return to capital. Then, nobody would invest and the return to capital
would be inﬁnity. But this means that the bubble must grow at a rate inﬁnity and this is not possible.
5unit of capital costs one unit of consumption and it fully depreciates in one period. Equation (6)
says that, for bubbles to be feasible, they cannot outgrow the economy’s savings. The savings of the
young consist of labor income and the value of new bubbles created by them, i.e. (1 − α) kα
t +bN
t .
Since the old do not save, the young must be purchasing the whole aggregate bubble, i.e. bt + bN
t .
The investment rate equals the income left after purchasing the bubbles as a share of output:





and this implies the following law of motion for the capital stock:
kt+1 = (1 − α)   kα
t − bt. (8)
Equation (8) shows the key feature of the Samuelson-Tirole model: bubbles crowd out investment
and slow down capital accumulation.






t=0 satisfying Equations (5), (6) and (8). The assumption that the young only
build capital is equivalent to adding the additional equilibrium restriction that bt = bN
t = 0 for all
t. This restriction cannot be justiﬁed on ‘a priori’ grounds, but we note that there always exists
one equilibrium in which it is satisﬁed.5
There are a couple of important diﬀerences between the model described here and the original
ones of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985). Unlike us, Samuelson analyzed an economy with a
linear production function or storage technology. Tirole analyzed instead a standard growth model
like the one we study. Unlike us, however, he made weak assumptions on preferences and technology.
In particular, he only assumed the existence of utility and production functions, Ut = u(ct,ct+1)
and F (lt,kt) with standard properties. Unlike us, both Samuelson and Tirole restricted the analysis
to the subset of equilibria that are deterministic and do not involve bubble creation or destruction.
That is, they imposed the additional restrictions that Etbt+1 = bt+1 and bN
t = 0 for all t.6,7 Despite
these diﬀerences, we label the model described above as the Samuelson-Tirole model to give due
credit to their seminal contributions.
5This equilibrium might not exist in the presence of rents. See Tirole (1985) and Caballero et al. (2010).
6Under these restrictions, any bubble must have existed from the very beginning of time and it can never burst,
i.e. its value can never be zero.
7To the best of our knowledge, Weil (1987) was the ﬁrst to consider stochastic bubbles in general equilibrium.
62.3 Bubbly episodes
An important payoﬀ of analyzing stochastic equilibria with bubble creation and destruction is that
this allows us to rigorously capture the notion of a bubbly episode. Generically, the economy
ﬂuctuates between periods in which bt = bN
t = 0 and periods in which bt > 0 and/or bN
t > 0.
We say that the economy is in the fundamental state if bt = bN
t = 0. We say instead that the
economy is experiencing a bubbly episode if bt > 0 and/or bN
t > 0. A bubbly episode starts when
the economy leaves the fundamental state and ends the ﬁrst period in which the economy returns
to the fundamental state.
The following proposition provides the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes in the
Samuelson-Tirole model:
Proposition 1 Bubbly episodes are possible if and only if α < 0.5.
The proof of this proposition exploits a useful trick that makes the model recursive. Let xt be
the aggregate bubble as a share of the labor income, i.e. xt ≡
bt
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t
.









xt ≤ 1. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) describe bubble dynamics. There are two sources of randomness in these
dynamics: shocks to bubble creation, i.e. xN
t ; and shocks to the value of the existing bubble, i.e. xt.
Any admissible stochastic process for xN
t and xt satisfying Equations (9) and (10) is an equilibrium
of the model. By admissible, we mean that the stochastic process must ensure that xt ≥ 0 and
xN
t ≥ 0 for all t. Conversely, any equilibrium of the model can be expressed as an admissible
stochastic process for xN
t and xt.
To prove Proposition 1 we ask if, among all stochastic processes for xN
t and xt that satisfy
Equation (9), there is at least one that also satisﬁes Equation (10). It is useful to examine ﬁrst
the case in which there is no bubble creation after a bubbly episodes starts. Figure 1 plots Etxt+1
against xt, using Equation (9) with xN
t = xN
s and xN
t = 0 for all t > s, where s is the period in
which the episode starts. The left panel shows the case in which α ≥ 0.5 and the slope of Etxt+1
at the origin is greater than or equal to one. Any initial bubble would be demanded only if it were
7expected to continuously grow as a share of labor income, i.e. Etxt+1 > xt in all periods. But this
means that in some scenarios the bubble outgrows the savings of the young in ﬁnite time, i.e. it
violates Equation (10). Therefore, bubbly episodes cannot happen if α ≥ 0.5. The right panel of
Figure 1 shows instead the case in which α < 0.5. Any initial bubble xs+1 >
1 − 2   α
1 − α
can be ruled
out with the same argument. But any initial bubble xs+1 ≤
1 − 2   α
1 − α
can be part of an equilibrium
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xt xt
Figure 1
Allowing for bubble creation does not relax the conditions for existence of bubbly episodes. To
see this, note that bubble creation shifts upwards the schedule Etxt+1 in Figure 1. The intuition is
clear: new bubbles compete with old bubbles for the income of next period’s young, reducing their
return and making them less attractive. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
This proof is instructive and helps us understand the connection between bubbles and dynamic
ineﬃciency. To determine whether a bubbly episodes can exist, we have asked: Is it possible to
construct a pyramid scheme that is attractive without exploding as a share of labor income? We




These processes exist if and only if α < 0.5.
To determine whether the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient, we ask: Is the economy accumulat-
ing too much capital? The answer is aﬃrmative if and only if the investment required to sustain the
8capital stock exceeds the income that this capital produces. Investment equals (1 − xt) (1 − α) kα
t ,
while capital income is given by α   kα
t . Therefore, the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient if and
only if
(1 − xt)   (1 − α)   kα
t > α   kα
t . (11)
Straightforward algebra shows that this condition is equivalent to asking whether there exist sto-
chastic processes for for xN
t and xt such that:
Etxt+1 < xt + xN
t .
These processes exist if and only if α < 0.5. Therefore, in the Samuelson-Tirole model the conditions
for the existence of bubbly episodes and dynamic ineﬃciency coincide.
2.4 The macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbles
To determine the macroeconomic consequences of bubbly episodes, we rewrite the law of motion of
the capital stock using the deﬁnition of xt:
kt+1 = (1 − xt)   (1 − α)   kα
t . (12)
Equation (12) describes the dynamics of the capital stock for any admissible stochastic process for
the bubble, i.e. xN
t and xt; satisfying Equations (9) and (10). This constitutes a full solution to
the model.
Interestingly, bubbly episodes can be literally interpreted as shocks to the law of motion of the
capital stock of the Solow model. To better understand the nature of these shocks, consider the
following example:
Example 1 ((n,p) episodes) Consider the subset of bubbly episodes that are characterized by (i)
a constant probability of ending, i.e. Prt (bt+1 = 0|bt > 0) = p and (ii) an initial bubble xN
s and
then a constant rate of new-bubble creation, i.e. xN
t = n   xt.
The left panel of Figure 2 shows a (n,p) episode. The solid line represents Equation (9), i.e. the
value of xt+1 that leaves the young indiﬀerent between buying the bubble or investing in capital.
A feature of (n,p) episodes is that the bubble declines as a share of labor income throughout the
episode, i.e. xt+1 ≤ xt for all t and xt → 0. Only if the initial bubble is maximal, i.e. xs+1 → x∗
1,
9this rate of decline becomes zero. This pattern of behavior is not generic, however, as the following
example shows:
Example 2 ((xN,p) episodes) Consider the subset of bubbly episodes that are characterized by
(i) a constant probability of ending, i.e. Prt (bt+1 = 0|bt > 0) = p and (ii) an initial bubble xN
s and
then a constant amount of bubble creation xN
t = xN.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows an (xN,p) episode. Any initial bubble converges to x∗
2. If
xs+1 < x∗
2, the bubble grows throughout the episode. If xs+1 > x∗
2, the bubble declines throughout
the episode. Once again, if the initial bubble is maximal, i.e. xs+1 → x∗∗
2 , this rate of decline











The only randomness in these examples refers to the periods in which they start and end.
Throughout the bubbly episode, the bubble moves deterministically until the episodes ends. This
need not be, of course. Assume, for instance, that bubble creation randomly switches between being
a fraction of the existing bubble, i.e. xN
t = n   xt; and being a constant amount, i.e. xN
t = xN.
That is, the laws of motion of the bubble in the right and left panels of Figure 2 operate at diﬀerent
(and random) times during a given bubbly episode. Then, xt will converge to the interval (0,x∗
2),
and then randomly ﬂuctuate within it until the episode ends.
Figure 3 shows the macroeconomic eﬀects of one of these bubbly episodes. Assume initially that
the economy is in the fundamental state so that the appropriate law of motion is the one labeled
kF
t+1. Since the initial capital stock is below the Solow steady state, i.e. kt < kF ≡ (1 − α)
1
1−α, the
10economy is growing at a positive rate. When a bubbly episode starts, the investment rate falls and
the law of motion shifts below the fundamental one. In the ﬁgure, kB
t+1 represents the law of motion
when the bubbly episode begins. The picture has been drawn so that the capital stock is above
the steady state associated to kB
t+1, i.e. kt > kB. As a result, growth turns negative. Throughout
the episode, kB
t+1 may shift up or down as the bubble grows or shrinks, although it always remains
below the original law of motion kF












At ﬁrst sight, one could think of bubbly episodes as akin to negative shocks to the investment
rate. But this would not be quite right. Bubbles also aﬀect consumption directly as passing the
bubble across generations increases the share of output that the old receive and consume:
ct = [α + (1 − α)   xt]   kα
t . (13)
The relationship between bubbles and consumption has therefore two diﬀerent aspects to it. Past
bubbles reduce the capital stock and, ceteris paribus, this lowers consumption. But present bubbles
raise the share of output in the hands of the old and, ceteris paribus, this raises consumption.
2.5 Discussion
Bubbles aﬀect allocations through two channels: (i) by implementing a set of intergenerational
transfers, and (ii) by creating wealth shocks. The ﬁrst channel is a central feature of a pyramid
scheme, by which buyers surrender resources today expecting future buyers to surrender resources to
11them. These intergenerational transfers are feasible because the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient.
The second channel are the wealth shocks associated with bubble creation and destruction. When
bubbles appear, those lucky individuals who create them receive a windfall or transfer from the
future. This is another central feature of a pyramid scheme whereby the initiator claims that,
by making him/her a payment now, the other party earns the right to receive a payment from a
third person later. By successfully creating and selling a bubble, young individuals have assigned
themselves and sold the “rights” to the income of a generation living in the very far future or, to
be more exact, living at inﬁnity. This appropriation of rights is a pure windfall or positive wealth
shock for the generation that creates them. Naturally, the opposite happens when bubbles burst
since this constitutes a negative wealth shock for those that are holding them and see their value
collapse.
Once extended to allow for random bubbles and random bubble creation and destruction,
the Samuelson-Tirole model provides an elegant and powerful framework to think about bubbly
episodes. Unfortunately, the macroeconomic implications of the Samuelson-Tirole model are at
odds with the facts along two key dimensions:
1. The model predicts that bubbles can only appear in dynamically ineﬃcient economies, i.e.
α ≤ 0.5. However, Abel et al. (1989) examined a group of developed economies and found
that, in all of them, aggregate investment, i.e. (1 − xt)   (1 − α)   kα
t , falls short of aggregate
capital income, i.e. α   kα
t .
2. The model predicts that bubbles lead to simultaneous drops in the stock of capital and output.
Historical evidence suggests however that bubbly episodes are associated with increases in the
capital stock and output.
We next show that these discrepancies between the theory and the facts rest on one important
assumption: ﬁnancial markets are frictionless.
3 Introducing ﬁnancial frictions
We extend the model by introducing a motive for intragenerational trade and a ﬁnancial friction
that impedes this trade. We show that this relaxes the conditions for the existence of bubbly
episodes. Moreover, these episodes can lower the return to investment and lead to expansions in
the capital stock.
123.1 Setup with ﬁnancial frictions
Assume that a fraction ε ∈ [0,1] of the young of each generation can produce one unit of capital
with one unit of the consumption good. We refer to them as “productive” investors. The remaining
young are “unproductive” investors, as they only have access to an inferior technology that produces
δ < 1 units of capital with one unit of the consumption good. This heterogeneity creates gains from
borrowing and lending. If markets worked well, unproductive investors would lend their resources
to productive ones and these would invest on everyone’s behalf. This would bring us back to
the Samuelson-Tirole model. We shall however assume that this is not possible because of some
unspeciﬁed market imperfection. The goal here is to analyze how this ﬁnancial friction aﬀects
equilibrium outcomes.
Now the evolution of the capital stock depends not only on the level of investment but also
on its composition. Let At be the average eﬃciency of investment. Then, Equation (1) must be
replaced by
kt+1 = st   At   kα
t . (14)
For instance, in the benchmark case in which the young use all their savings to build capital we
have that:
At = ε + (1 − ε)   δ ≡ A. (15)
Since all individuals invest the same amount, the average eﬃciency of investment is determined
by the population weights of both types of investors. The investment rate is still determined by
Equation (3) and the dynamics of the capital stock are given by
kt+1 = (1 − α)   A   kα
t . (16)
Since A < 1, ﬁnancial frictions lower the level of the capital stock but they do not aﬀect the nature
of its dynamics. This result does not go through once we allow for bubbles.
3.2 Equilibria with bubbles
The introduction of ﬁnancial frictions forces us to make an assumption about the distribution
of rents from bubble creation. In the Samuelson-Tirole model, all investment is carried out by
productive investors and the distribution of rents is inconsequential. With ﬁnancial frictions, this
is no longer the case since the distribution of wealth — and hence of these rents — aﬀects the average
13eﬃciency of investment. We use bNP
t and bNU
t to denote the stock of new bubbles created by




Recall that rationality imposes two restrictions on the type of bubbles that can exist. First,
bubbles must grow fast enough or otherwise the young will not be willing to purchase them. Second,
the aggregate bubble cannot grow too fast or otherwise the young will not be able to purchase them.
While the second of these restrictions still implies Equation (6), the ﬁrst of them now implies that
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Equation (17) is nothing but a generalization of Equation (5) that recognizes that the marginal
buyer of the bubble changes as the bubble grows. If the bubble is small, the marginal buyer is an
unproductive investor and the expected return to the bubble must equal the return to unproductive
investments. If the bubble is large, the marginal buyer is an productive investor and the expected
return to the bubble must be the return to productive investments.
Bubbles aﬀect both the level of investment and its composition. As in the Samuelson-Tirole
model, the bubble reduces the investment rate and Equation (7) still holds. Unlike the Samuelson-





(1 − α)   A   kα
t + (1 − δ)   bNP
t − δ   bt















To understand Equation (18), note ﬁrst that in the fundamental state bt = bNP
t = bNU
t = 0 and
the average eﬃciency of investment equals the population average A. Bubbles raise the eﬃciency
of investment through two channels. First, existing bubbles displace a disproportionately high
share of unproductive investments. This is why At is increasing in bt. Second, bubble creation
by productive investors raises their income and expands their investment. This is why At is also
increasing in bNP
t . When all unproductive investments have been eliminated, the average eﬃciency
of investment reaches one.
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t
(1 − ε)   (1 − α)   kα
t
< 1
(1 − α)   kα
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bt + bNP
t




Bubbles now have conﬂicting eﬀects on capital accumulation and output. On the one hand, ex-
isting bubbles reduce the investment rate. On the other hand, new bubbles raise the eﬃciency of




 bt, bubbles are contractionary and crowd




  bt, bubbles are expansionary
and crowd in capital.
We are ready to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for the modiﬁed model. For a given ini-






t=0 satisfying Equations (6), (17) and (19). As we show next, there are many
such equilibria.
3.3 Bubbly episodes with ﬁnancial frictions
The following proposition provides the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes in the model
with ﬁnancial frictions:
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if A ≤ 1 − ε
.
Proposition 2 generalizes Proposition 1 to the case of ﬁnancial frictions. Once again, we use the
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xt ≤ 1. (21)
Equations (20) and (21) describe bubble dynamics in the modiﬁed model. Any admissible stochastic
process for xNP
t , xNU
t and xt satisfying Equations (20) and (21) is an equilibrium of the model.




To prove Proposition 2 we ask again if, among all stochastic processes for xNP
t , xNU
t and xt
that satisfy Equation (20), there is at least one that also satisﬁes Equation (21). Consider ﬁrst
the case in which there is no bubble creation after a bubbly episode starts. Figure 4 plots Etxt+1






t = 0 for all t > s,




and the slope of Etxt+1 at the origin is greater than or equal to one. This means that
any initial bubble would be demanded only if it were expected to continuously grow as a share of
labor income, i.e. if it violates Equation (21), and this can be ruled out. The right panel of Figure
4 shows the case in which α <
A
A + δ
. Now the slope of Etxt+1 at the origin is less than one and,
as a result, Etxt+1 must cross the 45 degree line once and only once. Let x∗ be the value of xt at
that point. Any initial bubble xs+1 > x∗ can be ruled out. But any initial bubble xN
s ≤ x∗ can be








Is it possible that bubble creation relaxes the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes?
Consider ﬁrst bubble creation by unproductive investors, i.e. xNU
t . As in the Samuelson-Tirole
model, this type of bubble creation shifts the schedule Etxt+1 upwards. The intuition is the same as
before: new bubbles compete with old bubbles for the income of next period’s young, reducing their
return and making them less attractive. Therefore, allowing for bubble creation by unproductive
investors does not relax the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes.
Consider next bubble creation by productive investors, i.e. xNP
t . This type of bubble creation
shifts the schedule Etxt+1 upwards if xt ∈ (0,A] ∪ (1 − ε,1], but it shifts it downwards if xt ∈
(A,1 − ε]. To understand this result, it is important to recognize the double role played by bubble
creation by productive investors. On the one hand, new bubbles compete with old ones for the
income of next period’s young. This eﬀect reduces the demand for old bubbles and shifts the
schedule Etxt+1 upwards. On the other hand, productive investors sell new bubbles to unproductive
investors and use the proceeds to invest, raising average investment eﬃciency and the income of
next period’s young. This eﬀect increases the demand for old bubbles and shifts the schedule Etxt+1
downwards. This second eﬀect operates whenever xt ≤ 1−ε, and it dominates the ﬁrst eﬀect only
if xt ≥ A. Hence, if A > 1 − ε, bubble creation by productive investors cannot relax the condition
for the existence of bubbly episodes.
If A ≤ 1 − ε, bubble creation does relax the condition for the existence of bubbles. Namely,
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. Figure 5 provides some intuition for
this result by plotting Etxt+1 against xt, using Equation (20) and assuming that xNU
t = 0 while
17xNP
t = xNP






0 if xt ∈ (0,A] ∪ (1 − ε,1]
1 − ε − xt if xt ∈ (A,1 − ε]
,
for all t > s. The left panel shows the case in which bubble creation by productive investors does
not aﬀect the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes. The right panel shows instead the
case in which bubble creation by productive investors weakens the conditions for the existence of









With ﬁnancial frictions, the connection between bubbles and dynamic ineﬃciency becomes more
subtle. To determine whether a bubbly episodes can exist, we asked again: Is it possible to construct
a pyramid scheme that is attractive without exploding as a share of labor income? We have shown





These processes exist if and only if α satisﬁes the restriction in Proposition 2.
To determine whether the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient, we ask again: Is the economy
accumulating too much capital? This question is now tricky because there are two types of invest-
ments. The condition that aggregate investment be higher than aggregate capital income, i.e.
(1 − xt)   (1 − α)   kα
t > α   kα
t ,
18asks whether the average investment exceeds the income it produces. Even if this were not the case,
the economy might still be dynamically ineﬃcient since it might contain pockets of investments
that exceed the income they produce. We need to check for this additional possibility. Investments
by unproductive investors equal
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t
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t . Therefore, these investors constitute a pocket of dynamic
ineﬃciency if and only if:
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t
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t − δ   xt
  α   kα
t . (22)
Straightforward algebra shows that this condition holds if and only if there exist stochastic processes
for for xNP
t and xt such that:







1 + 4   (1 − ε)   δ
this restriction is weaker than the condition for the existence of
bubbly episodes in Proposition 2. The intuition for this result is that sometimes bubbly episodes can
only exist if there is enough bubble creation. This requires the economy to be not only dynamically
ineﬃcient, but to be suﬃciently so to support bubble creation.
This discussion sheds some light on the analysis of Abel et al. (1989). The ﬁnding that aggregate
investment falls short of aggregate capital income still implies that α > 0.5. Under this parameter
restriction, ﬁnancial frictions are crucial for bubbly episodes to exist and their removal would
eliminate these episodes at once. But it does not follow that, under this parameter restriction,
bubbly episodes cannot exist. This is for two reasons: (i) if 0.5 < α <
A
A + δ
, in the fundamental






1 + 4   (1 − ε)   δ
, there are no pockets of dynamic ineﬃciency in the
fundamental state but an expansionary bubble that lowers the return to investment would create
such pockets itself. This second case brings a simple but powerful point home: what is required for
bubbly episodes to exist is that the economy be dynamically ineﬃcient during these episodes and
not in the fundamental state. Bubbles that crowd in capital can convert a dynamically eﬃcient
economy into a dynamically ineﬃcient one.
3.4 The macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbles revisited
We have shown that ﬁnancial frictions weaken the conditions for bubbly episodes to exist. We show
next that they also modify the macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbly episodes. To do this, we rewrite
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Equation (23) describes the dynamics of the capital stock for any admissible stochastic process
for the bubble, i.e. xNP
t , xNU
t and xt; satisfying Equations (20) and (21). Once again, note that
bubbly episodes are akin to shocks to the law of motion of capital. As in the Samuelson-Tirole
model, bubbles can grow, shrink or randomly ﬂuctuate throughout these episodes.
The macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbly episodes depend on whether xNP
t is smaller or greater
than xt  
δ
1 − δ
. If smaller, bubbly episodes are contractionary and they lower the capital stock
and output. If greater, bubbly episodes are expansionary and they raise the capital stock and
output.8 Contractionary episodes are similar in all regards to those analyzed in the Samuelson-
Tirole model. As for expansionary episodes, their macroeconomic eﬀects are illustrated in Figure
6. Assume initially that the economy is in the fundamental state so that the appropriate law
of motion is the one labeled kF
t+1. This law of motion for the fundamental state is that of the
standard Solow model. Assume that, initially, the capital stock is equal to the Solow steady state
so that kt = kF ≡ [A   (1 − α)]
1
1−α. When an expansionary bubble pops up, it reduces unproductive
investments and uses part of these resources to increase productive investments. As can be seen
from Equation (23), the law of motion during the bubbly episode lies above kF
t+1: in the ﬁgure, kB
t+1
represents the initial law of motion when the episode begins. As a result, growth turns positive.
Throughout the episode, kB
t+1 may shift as the bubble grows or shrinks. The capital stock and
output, however, unambiguously increase relative to the fundamental state. Eventually, the bubble
bursts and the economy returns to the original law of motion kF.











Expansionary and contractionary episodes diﬀer also in their implications for consumption. In
this model, consumption is still expressed by Equation (13). Therefore, regardless of their type,
all present bubbles raise the income in the hands of the old and thus consumption. However, the
eﬀect of past bubbles depends on their type. If they were contractionary, the current capital stock
and therefore consumption are lower. If instead they were expansionary, the current capital stock
and therefore consumption are higher.
3.5 Discussion
The Samuelson-Tirole model has been criticized because the conditions for the existence of bubbly
episodes and their macroeconomic eﬀects seem both unrealistic. We have shown that these crit-
icisms do not apply to the model with ﬁnancial frictions. In particular, (i) bubbly episodes are
possible even if aggregate investment falls short of capital income and; (ii) bubbly episodes can
be expansionary. The critiques to the Samuelson-Tirole model therefore stem from the assump-
tion that ﬁnancial markets are frictionless and rates of return to investment are equalized across
investors.
We can summarize our ﬁndings on the connection between bubbles and ﬁnancial frictions with
the help of Figure 7. The line labeled αC provides, for each δ, the largest α that is consistent with
the existence of contractionary episodes.9 The line labeled αE provides, for each δ, the largest α






21that is consistent with the existence of expansionary episodes.10 These lines partition the (α,δ)













Bubbly episodes are possible in Regions II-IV, but not in Region I. In Regions II and III, α < αC
and contractionary episodes are possible. In Region III and IV, α < αE and expansionary episodes
are possible. We can think of δ as a measure of the costs of ﬁnancial frictions. The higher is δ, the
smaller are the gains from borrowing and lending and the smaller are the costs of ﬁnancial frictions.
In the limiting case of δ → 1, the Samuelson-Tirole model applies: only contractionary episodes
are possible and this requires α < 0.5. As δ decreases, the conditions for existence are relaxed for
both types of bubbly episodes. In the limiting case of δ → 0, ﬁnancial frictions are very severe and
all types of bubbly episodes are possible regardless of α.
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11Figure 7 has been drawn under the assumption that ε < 0.5. This guarantees that Region IV exists.
224 Bubbles and long-run growth
The Samuelson-Tirole model predates the development of endogenous growth models. To maximize
comparability, the model with ﬁnancial frictions used the same production structure. Not surpris-
ingly, it has little to say about the relationship between bubbles and long-run growth. We now
generalize the production structure and allow for the possibility of constant or increasing returns
to capital. We show that the conditions for existence of bubbly episodes do not change. However,
even transitory episodes have permanent eﬀects and can even lead the economy into or out of
negative-growth traps.
4.1 Setup with long-run growth
We assume that the production of the ﬁnal good consists of assembling a continuum of intermediate
inputs, indexed by m ∈ [0,mt]. This variable, which can be interpreted as the level of technology
in period t, will be obtained endogenously as part of the equilibrium. The production function of
the ﬁnal good is given by the following symmetric CES function:













where qtm denotes units of the variety m of intermediate inputs and   > 1. The constant η
is a normalization parameter that will be chosen later. Throughout, we assume that ﬁnal good
producers are competitive, and we normalize the price of the ﬁnal good to one.
Production of intermediate inputs requires labor and capital. In particular, each type of inter-
mediate input m ∈ [0,mt] is produced according to the following production function,
qtm = (ltm,v)
1−α   (ktm,v)
a , (25)
where ltm,v and ktm,v respectively denote the use of labor and capital to cover the variable costs of
producing variety m. Besides this use of factors, the production of any given variety requires the






1−α   (ktm,f)
a if qtm > 0
0 if qtm = 0
, (26)
23where ltm,f and ktm,f respectively denote the use of labor and capital to cover the ﬁxed costs of
producing variety m. To simplify the model, we assume that input varieties become obsolete in
one generation and, as a result, all generations must incur these ﬁxed costs. It is natural therefore
to assume that the production of intermediate inputs takes place under monopolistic competition
and free entry.
This production structure is a special case of that considered by Ventura (2005).12 He shows




where we have chosen units such that η = ( )
−    (1 −  ) −1. Maintaining the assumption of
competitive factor markets, factor prices can now be expressed as follows
wt = (1 − α)   k
α  
t and rt = α   k
α  −1
t . (28)
Equation (27) shows that there are two opposing eﬀects of increasing the stock of physical capital.
On the one hand, such increases make capital abundant and they have the standard eﬀect of
decreasing its marginal product. The strength of this diminishing-returns eﬀect is measured by
α. On the other hand, increases in the stock of capital expand the varieties of inputs produced
in equilibrium, which has an indirect and positive eﬀect on the marginal product of capital. The
strength of this market-size eﬀect is measured by  . If diminishing returns are strong and market-
size eﬀects are weak (α   < 1) increases in physical capital reduce the marginal product of capital.
If instead diminishing returns are weak and market-size eﬀects are strong (α     ≥ 1) increases in
physical capital raise the marginal product of capital.
4.2 Equilibria with bubbles
How does this generalization of the production structure aﬀect the dynamics of bubbles and capital?
For a bubble to be attractive, its expected return must be at least equal to the return to investment.
12The Appendix contains a formal derivation of the equations that follow.
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which is a generalization of Equation (19). For a given initial capital stock and bubble, k0 > 0 and






t=0 satisfying Equations (6), (29)
and (30).
4.3 Bubbly episodes with long-run growth
This generalization of the production structure expands the set of economies that can be analyzed
with the model. It does not, however, aﬀect the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes.
That is, Proposition 2 applies for any value of  . To see this, deﬁne xt ≡
bt
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. Once we apply our recursive trick to Equation (29), we
recover Equation (20). Hence, bubble dynamics are still described by Equations (20) and (21).
It is useful at this point to provide an additional characterization of the condition for dynamic
ineﬃciency. Combining Equations (22) and (30) we ﬁnd that the economy has pockets of dynamic
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This condition is quite intuitive. Remember that, for a bubble to exist, it must grow fast enough
to be attractive but no too fast to outgrow its demand, i.e. its growth must be between Gt+1 and
RU
t+1. When the condition in Equation (31) fails there is no room for such a bubble.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which α   < 1. Contractionary bubbles reduce Gt+1 and increase RU
t+1.
25This is why contractionary episodes are only possible if, in the fundamental state, Gt+1 > RU
t+1.
Expansionary bubbles, however, increase Gt+1 and lower RU
t+1. This is why expansionary episodes
are sometimes possible even if, in the fundamental state, Gt+1 < RU
t+1.
Consider next the case in which α     ≥ 1. Now, market-size eﬀects dominate diminishing
returns and the relationship between the capital stock and the return to investment is reversed.
Contractionary bubbles still reduce Gt+1 but now they also reduce RU
t+1. Despite this, we still
ﬁnd that contractionary episodes are only possible if, in the fundamental state, Gt+1 > RU
t+1.
The reason, of course, is that the decrease in RU
t+1 is small relative to the decrease in Gt+1.
Expansionary bubbles still increase Gt+1 but now they also increase RU
t+1. Despite this, we still
ﬁnd that expansionary episodes might be possible even if, in the fundamental state, Gt+1 < RU
t+1.
The reason, once again, is that the increase in RU
t+1 is small relative to the increase in Gt+1.
4.4 The macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbles
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Equation (32) describes the dynamics of the capital stock for any admissible stochastic process for
the bubble, i.e. xNP
t , xNU
t and xt; satisfying Equations (20) and (21). Once again, note that bubbly
episodes are akin to shocks to the law of motion of capital. As in previous models, bubbles can
grow, shrink or randomly ﬂuctuate throughout these episodes. If diminishing returns are strong
and market-size eﬀects are weak, i.e. α     < 1, all the analysis of Section 3 applies. Therefore, we
restrict the analysis to the new case in which diminishing returns are weak and market-size eﬀects
are strong, i.e. α     ≥ 1.
An interesting feature of bubbly episodes when α     ≥ 1 is that, even if they are transitory,
they can have permanent eﬀects on the levels and growth rates of capital and output. We illustrate
this with the help of Figure 9. The left panel depicts the case of an expansionary bubble. Initially,
the economy is in the fundamental state so that the appropriate law of motion is the one labeled
kF
t+1. Since the initial capital stock is below the steady state, i.e. kt < kF ≡ [(1 − α)   A]
1
1−α  ,
growth is negative. We think of this economy as being caught in a “negative-growth trap”. When
an expansionary bubble pops up, it reduces unproductive investments and uses part of these re-
26sources to increase productive investments. During the bubbly episode, the law of motion of capital
lies above kF
t+1: in the ﬁgure, kB
t+1 represents the initial law of motion when the episode begins.
Throughout the episode, kB
t+1 may shift as the bubble grows or shrinks. Growth may be positive
if, during the bubbly episode, the capital stock lies above its steady-state value as shown in the
ﬁgure. Eventually, the bubble bursts but the economy might keep on growing if the capital stock
at the time of bursting exceeds kF. The bubbly episode, though temporary, leads the economy out














Naturally, it is also possible for bubbles to lead the economy into a negative growth trap thereby
having permanent negative eﬀects on long-run growth. The right panel of Figure 9 shows an
example of a contractionary bubble that does this.
This section has extended the model to allow for endogenous growth. This does not aﬀect the
conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes. It does, however, aﬀect some of their macroeconomic
eﬀects. First, the behavior of the return to investment during bubbly episodes is reversed. Second,
bubbly episodes can have long-run eﬀects on economic growth.
5 Further issues and research agenda
We have developed a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, ﬁnancial fric-
tions lead to equilibrium dispersion in the rates of return to investment. During bubbly episodes,
unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. Because of this,
bubbly episodes channel resources towards productive investment raising the growth rates of cap-
ital and output. The model also illustrates that the existence of bubbly episodes requires some
27investment to be dynamically ineﬃcient: otherwise, there would be no demand for bubbles. This
dynamic ineﬃciency, however, might be generated by an expansionary episode itself.
Our analysis is incomplete in two important respects. The ﬁrst one refers to the connection
between bubbles and savings. Throughout, we have assumed that young individuals care only about
old age consumption and therefore save all of their income. That is, we have assumed that their
savings rate is constant and equal to one. The constancy of this savings rate has allowed us to exploit
a nice analytical trick that makes the model recursive. This assumption is not only unrealistic, but
also crucial for some results. For instance, a strong prediction of the model developed here is that
bubbly episodes reduce investment spending. If we allowed instead for the savings rate to respond
positively to income and/or negatively to the return to investment, expansionary bubbly episodes
could raise savings and investment spending.
The analysis is also incomplete because we have not studied the welfare implications of bubbly
episodes. Instead, we have focused exclusively on the conditions for these episodes to exist and their
eﬀects on macroeconomic aggregates. This omission does not reﬂect a lack of interest in our part.
To the contrary, we think that a full analysis of the welfare implications of bubbly episodes is a
central objective of the theory. The reason for this omission is that we have found a full treatment
of the issues to be quite involved. Moreover, some of the more interesting results require us to
extend the model in various directions. There is simply no space for this here.
Introducing ﬁnancial frictions in the Samuelson-Tirole model shows that bubbles can also help
to channel resources from ineﬃcient to eﬃcient investors. In our stylized model, this transfer of
resources happens exclusively in the market for bubbles. But this need not be so. Consider two
suggestive examples. Martin and Ventura (2010) introduce a credit market in which investors are
subject to borrowing constraints. The prospect of a future bubble raises the collateral of eﬃcient
investors and allows them borrow and invest more. In this setup, bubbles help transfer resources
from ineﬃcient to eﬃcient investors. But this happens in the credit market and not in the market
for bubbles. Ventura (2004) introduces a distinction between consumption and investment goods.
Bubbles reduce ineﬃcient investments and lower the price of investment goods, allowing eﬃcient
investors to invest more. In this setup, bubbles also help transfer resources from ineﬃcient to
eﬃcient investors. But this happens in the goods market and not in the market for bubbles. These
are only two examples, and much more needs to be done. The role of bubbles in resource allocation
remains an essentially unexplored topic.
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Proﬁt maximization by producers of intermediate good m can in turn be stated as
max
ltm,v,ltm,f,ktm,v,ktm,f
[qtm   ptm − (ltm,v + ltm,f)   wt − (ktm,v + ktm,f)   rt]
subject to Equations (25), (26) and (33). Replacing the ﬁrst and the last of these constraints into
the objective function, this optimization problem yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
ptm   qtm   (1 − α)
 
= ltm,v   wt,
ptm   qtm   α
 
= ktm,v   rt,
λtm   (1 − α) = ltm,f   wt,
λtm   α = ktm,f   rt,
where λtm denotes the multiplier on the constraint imposed by Equation (26). This constraint





















which, along with the zero proﬁt condition of intermediate goods producers yield
qtm =
1
  − 1
. (36)
Equation (36) says that, conditional on it being produced, the amount produced of any given
intermediate good is constant. We can use it to derive the number of varieties being produced
in equilibrium. To do so, we replace Equations (34)-(36) in the factor demands implied by the




























These conditions can be combined to derive the equilibrium number of varieties,
mt =




which, when replaced in the production function of Equation (24), delivers Equation (27).
32